



THE COMPETENCY OF WITNESSES.'
THI'RD ARTICLE.
Having laid down and illustrated the general rules of incom-
petency from a relation creating an interest in the suit and the
record, it will be convenient, in this last paper of the series, to con-
sider together some exceptions to these rules. They seem to be
allowed mainly upon grounds of public policy.2
§ 51. (1) It would be too obvious to mention, did not complete-
ness require it, that where a person incompetent is made competent
by express statute, his evidence must be received.3
§ 52. (2) If a person interested does all in his power to divest
his interest, as by offering to surrender or release it, but by the
refusal of some other person he is unable to do so, his competency
will nevertheless be restored. 4  So on the other hand, if a party
desiring the testimony of a person, offers to remove an interest which
Continued from page 78.
1 Phill. Ev. 144, 145, 149; and hence are mainly beyond the province of this
dissertation (see ante, 4, note, though apparently within the scope of some of
its general rules, and so, needful to be considered.
31 Greenlf. Ev. 415; 1 Phill. Ev. 134-144.
41 Phil. Ev. 149; Goodlittle vs. Walford, Doug. 143; 5 Term, 35, by Buller J.
The language of Mr. Phillips would hardly justify the assertion that a refusal of any
but aparty would have the effect of restoring the witnesses competency. Mr. Green-
leaf says, the refusal of a stranger would have the same effect. It is conceived this
better expresses the spirit of the rule. It ought not to be in the power of a third
person, by a mere non-feasance, t~deprive a party of a material witness.
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renders that person incompetent, he cannot, by refusing to have his
interest removed, deprive the party of his testimony.' Nor can a
witness render himself incompetent by refusing to release his inter-
est, or to have it released.'
§ 58. (3) The older authorities seem to have held that where one
person becomes entitled to the testimony of another, the latter
shall not be rendered incompetent to testify by reason of any
interest subsequently acquired in the event of the suit.8 If the rule
.be narrowed to cases where the interest has been created by the
fraudulent act of the adverse party,4 or out of the usual course of
business, by the vitness,5 except it be in cases where the person
was the original witness of the agreement between the parties,
8 it
would be questioned by fewer cases. If the subsequent interest has
been created by the party offering the witness, he is thereby rendered
incompetent for such party.7 Whether, if the person offered was
not the agent of both parties, and was not called as a witness of the
original transaction, but has bondfide in the usual course of business,
subsequently acquired an interest, is competent, is a question upon
which there are conflicting decisions: 8
11 Phill. Ev. 149; 1 Greenlf. Ev. 419.
21 Phill. Ev. 152; Horil vs. Stephenson, 5 Bing. 493; Clarke vs. Brown, 1 Barb.
215, (N. Y. R.)
3 Bent vs. Baker, 8 Term 27; 1 Phil. Ev. 150, 151; Jackson vs. Rnmsey, 3 Johns.
Cases, 234, 237.
4 Barbour vs. Nowel, Skin. 586; Cow. 736; 1 Phill. Ev. 150, 152; Forrester vs.
Pigou, 3 Camp. 389; 1 M. & Selw. 9, S.C.
5 Authorities in last note; 1 Greenlf. Ey. 418.
6 If the party is the original witness, he is competent. See 1 Phill. Ev. 151;
I Stark. Ev. 118; Rex vs. For. 1 Stra. 652; Phillips vs. Riley, 8 Conn. 266, 272;
Long vs. Bailie, 4 . & R. 222; Eastman vs. Winship. 14 Pick. 47.
71 Phill. Ey. 152, 153; Horil vs. Stephenson, 5 Bing. 493.
• Phill. Ev. 151, 152; 1 Greenlf. Ev.  418. Several States have held such a person
would be incompetent (authorities cited supra note 6.) The I. Manchester Manuf. Co.
10 Wend. 162; Cowen & Hills, notes, 273; Supplement to 1 Phill. Ev. 139. The
Supreme Court of the United States were equally divided in opinion in Winship vs.
U.S. Bank, 5 Pet. 529, 552. A question may arise which is well stated in a recentcase
in Maine, 27 Maine R. 56, thus: "the question to be decided is, whether one who
is liable to pay a debt may by his testimony as a witness cause another, who would
on payment of it have no claim on him, to become liable to pay the same debt."4k
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§ 54. (4) It i a general rule that agents, carriers, factors, brokers
and servants generally, are competent for their masters to prove
-ets done within the scope of their authority, and according to their
directions,' but not to disprove any tortious or negligent act, which
would subject them to an action by the master, if the master should
'ail in the first action.2  Thus a porter, journeyman or salesman, is
competent to prove the delivery of goods ;3 a factor to prove the
contract of sale even though he has a poundage, or is to have all he
has bargained for beyond a certain sum. 4 So a carrier is competent
for a bailor to prove that he paid money by mistake, in an action to
recover it back.' So a carrier's bookkeeper is competent for his
master ;6 the teller of a bank for a bank ;7 or a banker's clerk for a
banker ;8 also a shipmaster for the ship owner.9  So an agent is
And he was held competent, Philbrook vs. Handley, 27 Maine, 56. The same doc-
trine was held in Eastman vs. Winship, 14 Pick. 44; Rowcroft vs. Bassett, Peake's
Add. Cas. 199; Nicholson vs. May, 1 Wright 660. In Winship vs. U. S. Bank, 5
Peters, 629, the court was divided. In Collins vs. Ellis, 21 WVend, 397, the
witness was held incompetent, and the reason of the thing, as well as the weight of
authority, requires he should be, in actions, ex contractu. The interest is contingent.
In actions ex delicto the similarly situated is universally held competent.
' See ante; 42, notes, 1 Phill. Ev. 145, 146; Draper vs. W. N. Railroad,
11 Met. 505; Greenlf. Ev. 416. But if the agent has a direct legalinterest, he willbe
incompetent. Edwards vs. Lowe, 8 B. & C. 407; I do not observe that Mr. Greenleaf
has noticed the fact that this exception, allowing agents to testify, is limited to
general agents, and does not extend to agents to do single acts. 1 PhiU. Ev. 146, case
last cited. Williams vs. Little, 12 N. Hamp. 29, per Parker J.; Noble vs. Paddock,
19 Wend. 457; 13 N. H. 32.
2 1 Phill. Ev. 147; 1 Stark. Ev. 113; Fuller vs. Wheelock, 10 Pick. 135, 138;
McDowell vs. Stimpson, 3 Watts, 129; see ante, 42 notes; Smith vs. Seward,
3 Barr, 342; 11 Met. 505.
3 Bull. N. P. 289, 4 Term 590; Adams vs. Davis, 3 Esp. 48.
4 Sheppard vs. Palmer, 6 Conn. 95; Scott vs. Wells, 6 Serg. & R. 357; Benjamin
vs. Porteous, 2 H. Bla. R. 590; Canne vs. Sagoy, 4 Martin, 81.
6 Barker vs. Macrea, 3 Camp. 144.
£ Spencer vs. Goulding, Peake's Cas. 129.
7 Stafford Bank vs. Cornell, 1 N. Hamp. 192; O'Brien vs. La. State Bank, 5 Mar-
tin, 305, (N. S.) U. S. B. vs. Johnson, Id. 310 ; The Franklin Bank vs. Freeman, 11
Pick. 535 ; U. S. Bank vs. Stearns, 15 Wend. 314.
s Martin vs. Howell, 1 Stra. 647.
9 Millard vs. Hallett, 2 Caines, 77; Discadillas vs. Harris, 8 Greenlf. 298; Mar-
neon ts. Woodland, 2 C. & P. 65.
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competent to prove his own authority, if it be by parol.' This
class of exceptions is allowed on grounds of necessity and public
policy; for otherwise, affairs of daily occurrence could not be proved,
and trade and commerce would be ruinously embarrassed.2
§ 55. (5) There is another exception which relates to persons
who, upon the conviction of an offender, would be entitled to a reward
from government, or from a private individual ;3 or to restoration of
property stolen; or to a portion of a fine or penalty.' If the bene-
fit to be derived from a conviction was designed for the individual's
own advantage, he will, under the general rule, be incompetent ;5 if
to further public justice, by procuring the conviction of offenders,
his interest comes under the exception, and he is competent to sus-
tain the prosecution.' The legislature gives rewards to induce
individuals to exert themselves to bring the guilty to punishment.
Were the courts to make this reward a ground of incompetency,
they would in a measure defeat the purpose of the legislature. 7
The principle of this exception includes the case where, instead of a
pecuniary reward, an exemption from prosecution, or pardon, is
offered a person, upon conviction of another person.8  The person
entitled to such pardon or exemption, is a competent witness for the
prosecution.9 So generally, where the person will derive any other
benefit from the conviction of the offender, that person is still com-
I Birt vs. Kirshaw, 2 East, 458; McGonagle vs. Thornton, 10 Serg. & R. 251;
Lowbar vs. Shaw, 5 Mason, 242
2 1 Phil]. Ev. 144, 145, 146; 1 Stark. Ev. 113.
3 Rex vs. Williams, 9 B. & C. 556; per Bayley J. The interest is contingent.
1 Phill. Ev. 135-137; 1 Greenlf. Ev. 412.
5 Rex vs. Williams. 9 B. & C. 549; Conner vs. Paull, 4 Pick. 251; 2 Russ. on
Crimes, 60], 602. But if the penalty is to be recovered in a subsequent civil action,
he is not incompetent. I Phill. Ev. 65, 66; 9 B. & C. 557.
6 U. S. vs. Patterson, 3 McLean, 53, Id. 299; U. S. vs. Murphy, 16 Pet. 213.
And he will .- ill be competent, though in event of failure he will be liable to costs.
United States vs. Everests, 1 Morris, R. 206.
1 Phill. Ev. 136, 137, 135; 1 Gilbert's Ev. 114; 1 Greenlf. Ev. 412; U. S. vs.
Wilson, 1 Bald. 90; Conner vs. Moulton, 9 Mass. 30; Cowen & Hill's Notes to Phil].
Ev. 2d part, Supplement, 1556.
8 1 Phill. Ev. 136, 137; 1 Greenlf. Ev. 413.
9 Mead vs. Robinson, Willes, 422; Howard vs. Shepley, 4 East, 80.
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petent for the government.' As in an indictment for perjury where
the party indicted is a witness against him in a pending suit,2 so
a person whose name is forged is a competent witness for the State
against the forger.'
§ 56. Having .disposed of the exceptions to the general rules of
incompetency, it seems necessary that something should be said as to
the time and manner of bringing forward the objection of incom-
petency, and of removing it. The question of interest is a preliminary
question, to be determined by the court in the first instance.4 Aparty
may admit an interested witness to give evidence against him ;5 but, if he
knows the witness' interest, he should make objection the first oppor-
tunity.6  The proper time is before examination in chief; but if not
then discovered, it may be taken when discovered during the trial.
7
The party having a right to object, ought to do so as soon as he is
able, so as to give the opposite party an opportunity to release the
witness' interest.' But here the court has considerable discretion.9
'1 Phill. Ev. 62, 136, 137; 1 Greenlf. Ev. 114, 1 Stark. Ev. 234.
Bull. N. P. 232, 245; Abraham vs. Bunn, 4 Burr. 2251; a verdict in a criminal
case cannot be given in evidence in a civil action. 1 Greenlf. Ev. 537, 414; Bradley
vs. Bradley, 2 Fairf. 367; Com. vs. Horton, 9 Pick. 206.
* The People vs. Howell, 4 Johns. 296, 302. The People vs. Dean, 6 Cowen, 27;
Com. vs. Frost, 5 Mass. 53; The State vs. Staunton, 1 Iredell, 424. The rule was
anciently otherwise, 1 Greenlf. Ev. 414.
4 See ante, 5, and notes. See Walker vs. Sawyer, 13 N. Ramp. 191; Strawbridge
vs. Spane, 8 Ala. 820; which perhaps may be thought to somewhat limit the judge's
discretion or authority.
5 Ante, 3, note.
6 Donaldson vs. Taylor, 8 Pick. 390, 392; Griggs vs. Voorhies, 7 Blackf. 561. If
the objection is not taken as soon as the party has an opportunity, it cannot be taken
at all. 1 Greenl. Ev. 421, case.
7 1 Stark. Ev. 124; I Phill. Ev. 153,154. See Griggs vs. Voorhies, 7 Blackf. 561.
8 Talman vs. Dutcher, 7 Wend. 180; Doty vs. Wilson, 14 Johns. 378; Wade vs.
Lock, 5 C. & P. 454; 1 Greenlf. Ev. 121. The interest must be made clearly to
appear. Camden vs. Doveness, 3 How. S. C. R. 515, 530. After the examination of
the witness is completed, he cannot be objected to as interested. Dewdney vs. Palmer,
4 I. & W. 664; 1 Phill. Ev. 154. See Jackson vs. Jackson, 5 Cowen, 173; Flagg
vs. Mann, 2 Sumner, 487.
9 U. S. -)s. 0. 1 Paine, 400; Talbert vs. Clarke, 8 Pick. 51; Mohawk River vs.
Atwater, 2 Paige, 54; 1 Greenlf. Ev. 421.
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If the inter st of the witness is disclosed by his own testimony, he
will be alloined to answer questions tending to remove or explain
his competcncy, which if otherwise discovered, he would not be
allowed to answer.'
§ 57. There are two modes of proving the interest of the witness;
by his own examination ;2 and by evidence aliunde.3  If evidence of
interest has been given aliunde, it will not be proper to examine
the witness himself, to explain away his interest.4 But if the evi-
dence aliunde be rejected, he may be examined on the voir dire.5
If the interest of the witness was known before the examination on
the voir dire, and this fails to show his interest, the objecting party
cannot resort to other means of examination.8  But if the party did
not know the interest, it may be otherwise7 If the party have
1 Green)f. Ev. 422; Rex vs. Gisburn, 15 East, 57; Wandlers vs. Cawthorn, 1 M,
&. W. 321, (n) ; Miller vs. Mariners' Church, 7 Greenlf. 51 ; Stebbins vs. Sackett, 5
Conn. 258; Baxter vs. Rodman, 3 Pick. 435.
2 And his own mere statement that he is interested, is not sufficient to render him
incompetent. The party has a right to have him examined. C. vs. D. 4 M'Cord, 311
T. vs.M. 21 Wend. 608.
3 1 Phill. Ev. 154.
4 Mott vs. Hicks, 1 Cowen, 573 ; Evans vs. Gray, 1 Martin's R. N. S. 709; a party
cannot object to the competency of his own witness, 2d part Cowen & Hill's Notes to
Phill. Ev. Sup. 1576; but the rule is subject to qualifications. Crany vs. Sprague,
12 Wend. 41, 45; 1 Greenlf. Ev. 423.
5 Main vs. Nowson, Anthon's Cas. 13. So if the witness on his voir dire leaves it
doubtful whether he is interested, his interest may be shown aliunde. Shannon vs-
The Com. 8 S. & R. 444; Bank of Columbia vs. Magruder, 6 Har. & J. 172; 1
Greenlf. Ev. 423. The mere statement of the witness that he is interested, -with-
out actually showing such to be the fact, will not render him incompetent. C. vs.D.,
4 McCord. 311.
6 Phila. & Trenton Co. vs. Stimpson, 14 Peters, 448, 461 ; Harris vs. Wilson, 7
Wend. 57; Ordiorne vs. Winkley, 2 Gall. 53; Jacobs vs. Layburn, 11 M. & W. 685.
This rule is no -where very satisfactorily settled. See I Greenlf. Ev. 423, and notes.
If'in a subsequent stage of the suit the interest of the witness should appear, his
testimony will be rejected. Brockbank vs. Anderson, 7 Man. & Granger, 295, 313;
Walker vs. Sawyer, 13 N. Hamp. 191.
7 This would seem to be deducible from the general principles applicable to the
subject, though I have found no direct authority for the position. If a party did
not know the witness' interest it could not be said he had selected his method of
proof, I Greenlf. Ey. 423, 1 Phill. Ev. 156.
THE COMPETENCY OF WITNESSES.
kr owledge of the interest he should select his means of proof in the
outset, and he will generally be bound by it.,
§ 58. Release. It is a general rule having very few exceptions,2
that whenever a person is incompetent by reason of an interest in
the suit, his competency may be restored by release, whether his
interest be a vested one in himself, or consist of a liability over to
another person.3 The release should be given before the testimony
is closed,4 but if the trial be not ended, the court will permit the
witness to be examined,' whether the release be given to or by the
witness, it must be legally sufficient to extinguish his interest in the
suit or record:.6  But it seems there -are some interests which a release
is not sufficient to extinguish ;7 and still more which will require releases
to more than one person.8 A aelivery of a release to a third person9 or
to the court for the witness' benefit may restore the competency of
the witness, if at the time of giving his testimony he knew of the
release.10 So when a witness gave his testimony, relying upon the
1 Greenlf. Ev. 423; Stebbins vs. Sacket, 5 Conn. 258; authorities cited supra,
note a resort to one mode to prove interest on one ground will not prevent a
resort to the other to prove interest on a different ground, 5 Conn. 258.
3 There may be exceptions. Eastman vs. Winship, 14 Pick. 47.
3 1 Phill. Ev. 156, 157; 1 Greenlf. Ev. 426; Farmers & Mech. Bank vs. Champ.
Trans. Co., 18 Vt. R. 131; ibid. 614; ibid. 395; Dogan vs. Ashley, 1 Strobhart, 433;
Cunningham vs.Knight, 1 Barb. N. Y. 399.
4 Wade vs. Lock, 5 C. & P. 454; Talman vs. Dutcher, 7 Wend. 180; 1 Greenlf.
Bv. 426.
Authorities cited in last note; Doty vs. Wilson, 14 Johns. 378.
6 Beecher vs. Buckingham, 18 Conn. 110; Bridges vs. Armour, 5 Howard, U. S. 91;
Cully vs. Ross, 7 Blackf. 312; ibid. 317; Hutchinson vs. Potts, 18 Vermont, 614;
Ball vs. Bank of Ala., 8 Ala. R. 590; Cunningham vs. Knight, 1 Barb. 399; Ackley
vs. Buck, 18 Vt. 395; Kirk vs. Ewing, 2 Barr, 4.53; 1 Phill. Ev. 160.
7 Jacobson vs. Fountain, 2 Johns. 170; Abbey vs. Goodrich, 3 Day, 433; 1 Greenlf.
Ev. 428.
8 Hutchinson vs. Peters, 18 Vermont, 614; 1 Phill. Ev. 158, 159; W. vs. K. 4 B.
& Ad. 760; B. vs. S., 8 Bing. 369.
9 L. vs. K., 1 Yeates, 30; S. vs. S., 4 Hill, 225; V. vs. F., 15 Pick. 449. But see
Bull vs. Banh of Ala., 8 Ala. R. 590.
0 S. vs. S. 4 Hill, 225; 1 Greenlf. Ev. 429, note; Kyle vs. Bostick, 10 Ala.
589, seems to restrict the general doctrine as to giving release to third persons for the
witness' benefit. So a -witness may pay a sum of moaeyinto court, 1 Phili. Ev, 16].
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promise of a release, a refusal to give one was held to be no ground
for a new trial.' So if a witness offer a release which is refused,2
his competency is restored.
§ 59. It is not by a release only that a witness' competency may
be restored. Any act 4 or writing which has the legal effect of
extinguishing the interest which renders a person incompetent,
restores his competency.' Thus the transfer of stock by a stock-
holder,6 the assignment of his interest by a legatee ;7 the delivery to
the guarantor of the letter of guaranty ;' the removal from the note
of the name of the endorsee ;9 the payment of alegatee or distributee, 0
as they severally extinguish interest, will restore competency. So
by depositing a sufficient sum of money in court," or surrendering
the principal, the competency of the bail may be restored.' 2  So by
the operation of law extinguishing the interest, as by the statutes of
bankruptcy13 and limitation.14 So a defendant relying upon a cus-
tomary right may restore the competency by a waiver of so much of
' Hemming vs. English, 1 Cr. M. & R. 568; and 1 Phill. Bv. 160.
2 But a party may object to witness till the release is completed, 1 Greenlf.
Ev. 429.
3 1 Phill. Ev. 161; ante, 52, and see G. vs. W., 1 Doug. 139; 1 GreenlfEv. 430.
4 1 Phill. Ev. 160, 161; Beecher vs Buckingham, 18 Conn. 110; Soulder vs. Van
Rensselaer, 9 Wend. 293 ; Cowen & Hill's notes 257, 272, to Phill. Ev. 133, 137,
156; Drinkwater vs. Holaday, 11 Ala. R. 134; Warner vs. Daniels, 1 W & M. 90;
1 Greenlf. Ev. 392, note 2. So the delivery of a bond by an obligee. Beecher vs.
Buckingham, 18 Conn. 119.
5 1 Phil!. Ev. 156.
6 State vs. Catskill Bank, 18 Wend. 466; 11 ibid 627; B. vs. H., 6 M. & W. 701.
1 1 Phill. Ev. 156, 159; Mcllroy vs. McIlroy, 1 Rawle, 423.
8 Merchants Bank vs. Spicer, 6 Wend. 443. Or of a bond by the obligee. Beecher
v.s. Buckingham, 18 Conn. 119.
9 Stinmetz vs. Currie, 1 Dallas, 269; Watson vs. McLaren, 19 Wend. 557.
10 Levers vs. Van Buskirk, 4 Barr, 309; Clarke vs. Gannon, By. & M. 31.
1 1 Tidd's Pr. 259; R. vs. H., 1 M. & M. 289; W. vs F., 2 Chitty, 103.
12 Legget vs. Boyd, 3 Wend. 376; A. vs. IL, 13 Pick. 79, 15 ibid 468; 1 Phill.
Ev. 161.
33 Wright vs. Rogers, 3 MlcLean, 229; Bridges vs. Armour, 5 Howard, U. S. 91;
Onion vs. Fullerton, 19 Vermont, 317.
'4 lurray vs. Judah, t; Cowen, 484; Ludlow vs. Un. Ins. Co., S. & R. 119; G. vs. IV.
3 11. & J. 249.
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the defence as depends upon the custom2 So by a sale, assign-
ment or other transfer of an interest.2  But where the witness
has a real, direct and certain interest in the suit, his competency,
as a general rule, will not be restored by a mere remedy over against
another person.3 This remedy may not be equally certain as his
interest; and it hardly seems possible for the court, even if it have
authority, to determine upon the certainty or sufficiency of the
remedy.' But the witness may be competent, if the sufficiency of
the indemnification be admitted; so he will be if he have funds in his
own hands sufficient to indemnify him, or if funds are deposited for that
purpose with some officer of the court, or so under the control of the
court that the witness is certain of an indemnification without the
trouble and expense of resorting to an action. Where the only
indemnity is a bond, unless the sufficiency be admitted, or other
mere right of action, as it would rarely-render a person indifferent,
the better authorities hold the witnessincompetent.5
This brings us to the consideration-
§ 60. (IV.) Of incompetency from a relation as husband or wife of
one of the parties or persons interested, creating an interest in the
suit. Incompetency under this rule is founded in part upon interest
and in part upon considerations of public policy. 6 In some cases it is
I Peawitt vs. Tilly, 1 C. & P. 140.
Cowen & Hill's Notes 257, 272, to 1 Phill. Ev. 133, 137; 1 Phill. Ev. 156.
3 Paine vs. Hessey, 17 Maine, 274; P. vs. H., 27 ibid 57, 58; 1 Phill. Ev. 104;
1 Greenlf. Ev. 420; W. vs. A., 3 C. & P. 344; 0. vs. M., 2 Day, 399, 404: B.. vs.
L., 1 Paige, 157; A. vs. H., 13 Pick. 85; W. vs. T., 3 J. J. Marsh, 459, 461; S. vs.
M., 6 Greenlf. 364. If the witness admits he has ample security, he may be com-
petent, C. vs. T., 7 Cowen, 359; or if the adverse party admits the efficiency of the
bond, L. vs. A., 17 Wend. 19; B. vs. H., 13 Johns. 125; contra P. vs. H., 17 Pick.
272; see also E. vs. W., 14 Pick. 47.
'13 Johns. 125; 1 Greenlf. Ev. 420.
5 17 Pick. 269, 272; 17 Maine, 274; 27 Maine, 57, 58; Philbrook vs. Handly,
Supplement to 2d part C. & H. notes, 1544, 1545.
6 So far as this species of incompetency is founded upon "considerations of publie
policy," it is conceived not strictly to be within the scope of this dissertation. See
ante, 4. But the conflict of opinions well known to exist upon this sub-
ject, and the great difficulty of determining how far the rule of interest may be
properly considered as prevailing, have brought me to the conclusion that it will be
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easy, and in others it is difficult to determine which prevaile - and
yet in others both co-exist. In some cases the interests of husband
and wife are identical, while in others their interests are conflicting.
While therefore the law does not lose sight of the general rule with
regard to interest, it substantially proceeds upon the assumption that it
would be dangerous to the peace, and destructive of the happiness
of matrimonial and domestic life, and consequently in a high degree
detrimental to the public well-being, to permit a husband or a wife
to be a witness in a suit in which the other has an interest or is a
party.1
§ 61. Therefore neither husband nor wife is competent to testify
in a cause either civil or criminal to which the other is a party.2
The principle extends further and applies also to cases where the
husband or wife has an interest if it be direct3 in the suit which
renders him or her incompetent, and renders the other incompetent
also. 4 So a wife cannot testify to any matter which would subject her
safer to treat the whole subject together; if indeed, it could not be so treated in
less spoce, which is by no means certain. 1 Phill. Ey. 69 ; Mr. Phillips says "they
cannot be witnesses for each other, because their interests are absolutely the same:
they are not witnesses against each other because this is inconsistent with the rela-
tion of marriage." Though this rule is quite comprehensive, yet it is conceived
not to extend to or furnish a test for all cases in which the question of competency
may be raised. Burrell vs. Bull, 1 Sanford's N. Y. Ch. R. 15; Snyder Trustee vs.
Taft, 6 Binuey, 483; 7 J. J. Marsh. 263; 8 Paige, 60; Langley vs. Fisher, 9 Lond
Jur. 837. (But see 10 Pick. 261); 1 Bnrr. 424, per Ld. Mansfield; Davis vs. Din-
woody, 4 Term, 678.
2See generally 1 Phill. Er. 69-74. Supplement to*2d part Cowen & Hill's Notes
to Phill. Ev. 1554, 1555; 2 Taylor's Er. 985, to 1003; 1 Greenlf. Ev. 334, 336.
It may be laid down generally that where one is incompetent the other will be also.
Abbott vs. Clarke, 19 Vermont, 444. So the husband is not competent for the wife
in a suit respecting her separate property, though he has no interest, and this on
grounds of public policy. Burrell vs. Bull, Sanfd. N. Y. Ch. R. 15; 8 Paige, 50;
See R. vs. L., 10 Pick. 261.
1 Phill. E. 69, 70, 71, 74; 1 Greeelf. Er. 334; Burrell vs. Bull, Sandf. N.
Y. Ch. R. 15.
* Dyer vs. Homer, 22 Pick. 253.
4 1 Phill. Ev. 70; 1 Greehlf. Ev. 241; Abbott vs. Clarke, 19 Vt. 444. Though
the authorities are numerous, the rule is too clear to require any citation of
them. But see Littlefield vs. Rice, 10 Met. 287. Where the wife, being the hus-
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husband to a criminal indictment,' or which would directly tend to
discharge him,' nor in any suit by the result of which the rights of
her husband will be bound, though he be not a party.3 And in all
such cases the same rule prevails and renders the husband4 incom-
petent, if the wife have an interest or be a party.
§ 62. But in collateral proceedings not immediately affecting their
marital interests, though the evidence may tend to criminate the
other, or subject the other to a legal demand, they are nevertheless
competent.- It is conceived this exception only prevails in cases in
which neither has a legal interest, and of which the record could not
be evidence for or against either in another.action.
6
§ 63. The general rule as to the incompetency of husband and
wife will apply without regard to the time when the relation of hus-
band- and wife commenced. 7 Hence if one party marry the other's
witness, even after she is summoned, the marriage makes her incom-
band's agent was held competent to swear to entries made by his direction, though
he was interested, and this on the ground of necessity. ' See contra Carr vs. Cor-
nell, 4 Vt. 116.
'Dew vi. Johnson, 3 Harr. 87.
2 Pullen vs. The People, 1 Doug. (Mich.) 48; 1 Phil]. Ev. 74, 75; 1.Greenlf Ev.
335; 1 Stra. 104; R. vs. Fadwick, 2 Stra. 1095.
3 Dew vs. Johnson, 3 Harr. 87; see also 1 H. P. C. 301; R. vs. H., 1 Moody Cr.
Cases, 281, 289, where the principle is extended. She is not competent in case of
conspiracy. The Comm. vs. Munson, 2 Ashurst, 31 ; 1 Ry. & M. 352 ; 5 Esp. 107.
4 Rex vs. Sergeant, 1 Ry. & Moo. 352; 1 Greenlf. Ev. 336; 1 Phill. Ev. 74.
If they are admissible for, they are also against each other, R. vs. Sergeant, 1
By. & M. 352.
5 1 Phill. Ev. 71, 72; Rex vs. All Saints, 6 M. & S. 194. 'Griffin vs. Brown, 2 Pick-
308; 2 Stark. Ev. 401;'Baring vs. Ruder, 1 Hen. & Mum. 154; Herman vs. Dickin-
Bon, 5 Bing. 183.
6 1 Phill. Ev. 73, 74; 1 Greenlf. Ev. 342. It would seem to follow from this
that, what in the text is stated as an exception to the general rule of incompetency
is in truth no exception at all. For since the evidence affects no direct interest, and
the record cannot *be used as evidence in any subsequent action, the case comes
within no rule rendering a person incompetent, and at most can be but an exception
to some principle of publicpolicy, rendering testimony inadmissible. Even in these
collateral cases, Mr. Taylor, in his new work, 2 Taylor on Ev. 997, p. 907, thinks
the wife could not be compelled to testify, and cites, R. rg. All Saints, 6 M. & S. 200,
per Bayley J.
1 Greenlf. Ev. 336.
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petent.' And whatever comes to the knowledge of husband or wnife,
through the marriage relation, neither will be competent to disclose
in evidence 2 even after that relation has ceased to exist.3 But
neither the reason nor the rule applies to knowledge derived from
other sources, when sought to be disclosed after that relation is
terminated.' This protection, however, only applies to cohabitations
innocent in the eye of the law ;5 or at best to cases where parties
bona fide live together, thinking themselves lawfully married.6
§ 64. It is yet unsettled by the authorities, whether the husband's
consent will render the wife a competent witness against him.7
And the difficfilty of the question seefis mainly to grow out of a
difference of opinion, as to whether the husband and wife are held
incompetent on the ground of interest, or from considerations of
public policy." If on the ground of interest, consent may con-
sistently be held to restore competency ;9 if from considerations
of public policy, it is difficult to perceive why consent should render
the testimony admissible.10
§ 65. Exceptions. The ends of justice, and the protection of the
wife, alike demand some exceptions to the foregoing rule. 1 Thus the
enormity and danger of the crime of high treason has been held to
Pedley vs. Wellesey, 3 C. & P. 558. This is an exception to the general rule
that one party cannot deprive another of his witness. Birt vs Baker, 3 Term. 27.
1 Phill. Ev. 75; Stein vs. Bowman, 13 Pet. 209; State vs. Jolly, 3 Dev. &-Batt.
110. This does not apply to unlawful cohabitations, W. vs. F. 5 C. & P. 12.
3 Barnes vs. Camack, 1 Barb, (Law) N. Y. R. 392; 1 Greenlf. Ev. 337.
4 Connell vs. Vanartesdale, 4 Barr, 364; Coffin vs. Jones, 13 Pick. 445.
5 1 Phill. Ev. 69, 70; 2 Stark. Ev. 400; Batthems vs. Galindo, 4 Bing. 610; Bull.
N. P. 287.
6 1 Phill. Ev. 70; Campbell vs. Twemlon, 1 Rice, 81; Divoll vs. Leadbetter, 4
Pick. 220; Wells vs. Fisher, 1 M. & Rob. 99, note; 5 C. & P. 12.
7 1 Phill. Ev. 76; 1 Greenlf. Ev. 340; 2 Taylor on Ev. 905, 906, 905.
8 1 PhilL Ev. 76; 1 Taylor's Ev. 995, 1 Greenlf. Ev. 341.
9 2 Taylor Ev. 995; Barker vs. Dinie, Cas. temp. Hardw. 264; Randall's case.
5 City Hall gee. 141, 153, 154; Colburn's case, 1 Wheeler's Crim. Cas. 479.
'0 2 Taylor Ev.!, 995; Pedley vs. Wellesly, 3 C. & P. 558; D. vs. D., 4 Term, 679.
1 21 Gilbert's Ev. 19; 1 Phil. Ev. 71; 1 Greenlf. Ev. 345; 4 Bli. Com. 29; 2 Stark.
Ev. 404, note (6) ; Roscoe's Crim Bv. 114. The prevailing opinion is that the wife
is not compellable to testify against her husband. 2 Taylor's Ev. 910, 1001.
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set aside the general rule of incompetency, as regards husband and
wife. But the authorities are contradictory.' Important exceptions
also are allowed in certain cases for the protection of one party
against the other. But these exceptions do not avail in every case
where no other evidence can be had 2 but only in those cases where
the party would otherwise be exposed without remedy to personal
injury.3 Hence the wife may exhibit articles of peace against her hus-
band, and her affidavit will be received.4 So she is competent against him
in an indictment for rape ;5 or for an assault and battery upon her.
6
Upon similar principles the wife has been allowed to testify to secret
facts, which none but herself could know ;7 as to prove her criminal
connection ;" but public decency forbids that she should be heard in
a court of justice to deny that she had lawful connection with her
husband.' If the husband make the wife his agent, he will be bound
by her admissions, 10 and (if she consent at least) she will be a com-
petent witness in certain cases for him.i
I Mr. Phillips thinks the wife cannot in a case of high treason be compelled to give
evidence against her husband. 1 PhilL Ev. 71.
1 1 Greenlf. Ev. 343; 2 Taylor's Ev. 1000, p. 908 ; Bailly vs. Cook,.3 Doug. 424.
3 1 Phill. By. 79; Whitehouse case, 2 Russ. 606, per Holroyd J. ; 1 Greenlf. Ev.
343. But see Wakefield's case, 2 Selw. Cr. Cases, 287; per Hullock, B.; People vs.
Chegary, 18 Wend. 64.2 See an analagous principle in County vs. Leidy, 10 Barr, 46.
4 1 Phill. Ev. 79; Vane's case, 2 Stra. 1202; notes to Ford's case, 13 East, 171.
6 1 Phill Ev. 79; 1 Hale's P. C. 301; Audley's case 3 Howell's St. Tr. 413; R.
vs. Jellyman, 8 C. & P. 604.
6 Juggan's case, 1 East P. C. 454; Bull. N. P. 287; State vs. Davis, 3 Brevand, 3.
So she is competentfor her husband in such case. State vs. Weill, 6 Ala. 685; Soule's
case 5 Greenlf. 407.
7 1 Phil. Ev. 78. She is equally competent for or against him, Bull. N. P. 287.
So a wife's dying declarations are admissible. John's case, 1 East P. C. 357; 2 Tay-
lor's Ev. 1002.
8 1 Phill. Ev. 80; R. vs. Reading, temp. Hard. 82; Com. vs. Shepjard, 6
Binn. 283.
9 The State vs. Patteway, 3 Hawk. 623; 1 Phill. Ey. 74; R. vs. Kea, 11 East,
132; 8 ibid 203; (but see R. vs. Stuffe, 8 East, 203; 1 Phill. Ev. 80); G. vs. M.
Cowp. 594; C. vs. C., 1 M. & Rob. 369, 276.
10 1 Phill. Ev. 77; White vs. Cuyler,.6 Term 176 ; Clifford vs. Burton, 1 Bing. 198.
1 Littlefield vs Rice, 10 Met. 287; contra Carr vs. Cornell, 4 Vt. 116; see also
County vs. Leidy, 10 Barr, 46; see McGill vs. Rowland, 3 Barr, 451, where the wife
